B4. Why new structures do not automatically replace old patterns

Argyris (1977, sections «How Organizations Learn» and «Changing the Learning System») distinguishes correcting errors within existing governing conditions from examining those conditions. His Model II connects information, choice and internal commitment; understanding is not the same as enacted behaviour. This earlier work already addresses essential connections within our question. The location and limitations of the text reproduction consulted are given in Q01.

Schein (1984, pp. 3-4, Fig. 1) distinguishes visible artefacts, espoused values and basic assumptions. Their cultural meaning cannot be reliably inferred from observable signs alone; espoused values may also be retrospective justifications. For our investigation, this means that mission statements, decisions and the reasons given for them must be checked against one another. This inference is based on the original article, not on a claimed reading of the book edition by Schein and Schein (2017).

Burke and Litwin (1992) and Bartunek and Moch (1987), introduced in B2.3, already treat culture and interpretative frameworks as objects of change. Describing something as a causal model is not equivalent to confirming each individual relationship. The abstracts read are sufficient for the limited statement that examining fundamental interpretations is already a subject of research; they are insufficient for reconstructing or validating the models (Q02, Q03).

Greenwood and Hinings (1996) already include radical organisational change in the title and subject of their work. This bibliographical reference is sufficient here to reject a claim of novelty for the expression. Their detailed mechanisms are not reconstructed without access to the original text. The learning, culture and change approaches explained above are central to defining the substantive boundaries of our working definition. Any additional explanatory power must be tested against them and against simpler alternatives.

In our investigation, unlearning denotes a particular previous assumption about action losing its guiding role, not the deletion of knowledge. This is our own conceptual stipulation, connected to Argyris's examination of existing governing conditions (1977). Nystrom and Starbuck's contribution To avoid organizational crises, unlearn (1984) remains listed as a bibliographical research pointer; its original argument, which was not fully available, supports no additional detailed claim here. The following thought experiment is our own construction, not a case taken from that article.

An earlier rule may have arisen for good reason. For example, after erroneous commitments, an owner may have decided to approve all larger customer discounts herself. In a small organisation, this might lead to carefully prepared offers. After growth and an increase in the number of different customer cases, the same rule may become a bottleneck. The obvious response would be to change the approval process. However, if the conviction remains that only personal control guarantees responsibility, new powers may be withdrawn at the first sign of uncertainty.

This thought experiment does not imply a general obligation to reduce control. Existing control might remain appropriate where financial risks are high. What matters is whether its function, the alternatives and its consequences are examined afresh. Deliberately retaining something can express sound judgement; retaining it uncritically is no evidence of that. Unlearning consequently does not mean deleting the entire past, but a specifically examined assumption that is no longer viable losing its guiding role.

It would be equally wrong to declare the underlying assumption the sole origin of all change. New work structures can give people experiences that only then change their perspective. A different incentive system can facilitate changed practices without everyone involved having been internally convinced beforehand. At the same time, a changed conviction can remain ineffective if responsibilities, resources and legal constraints remain unchanged.

Bartunek (1984) investigates this interaction through a reorganisation of a religious order. According to the accessible abstract, changes in interpretive frameworks and structural change are not linked in a simply linear way; participants' actions and emotional reactions mediate the process. Bartunek and Franzak (1988, abstract) report changes in cooperation and in interpretations of organisational importance during an internal merger within a religious order. These are case-based empirical connections, not direct validation of the four characteristics that this study defines later.

Sound evidence therefore requires at least three levels: statements about the past and the present, observed decisions and the organisational conditions of those decisions. The public assertion «We now lead on the basis of trust» is a declaration. New decision rights that are actually exercised are an observable change. Whether leaders were internally committed to that change or merely tolerated it outwardly requires additional evidence.

Institutional stabilisation is not necessarily good. A newly established practice can durably shield itself from justified criticism. An organisation can develop strong commitment, well-rehearsed routines and a clear purpose that later proves unsuitable or harmful. This is another reason why depth of change, actual adoption, duration and outcome must be kept separate. A consistent new system is not yet a good system.

The possibility of a stable but unsuitable order is an analytical counter-question in our model, not a claim about frequency. Bartunek and Ringuest (1989) would offer a possible empirical comparison concerning conflicts when orientation changes; the original text was not accessible, so the reference counts neither as an analysed counter-case nor as causal proof (Q18).

Moreover, some conflicts cannot be resolved through better mutual understanding. Those involved may know the same facts and still have different legitimate interests. A decision made through an established procedure is then required, rather than an invented consensus. A serious organisational model must allow dissent, reasoned decisions not to proceed and the reasoned termination of an initiative.

Taylor (2004, pp. 1-2) describes social imaginaries as the background through which people understand their shared practices. He does not treat them as mere ideas alongside unchanged institutions. The textual reference is based on the book preview (Q07). Our application to companies remains a limited analogy, not a business diagnostic approach developed by Taylor. No comprehensive analysis of his book is claimed.

For our question, the limited analogy is this: an adopted mission statement is not yet an expectation repeatedly lived out. Whether responsibility is justified and practised differently must be investigated in relationships and decisions. No fixed timespan for such a change is inferred from the passages of Taylor examined.

This study does not claim to have discovered culture, internal adoption, unlearning or radical change for the first time. The distinction between successful implementation and the hoped-for benefits is also already explicit in Weiner (2009, section «What outcomes result from organizational readiness for change?»). It cannot serve as our exclusive discovery. Nor is the connection between information, choice and internal commitment a unique feature of our work; the direct comparison with Argyris (1977) confirms this limit. The proposed original contribution is narrower: to bring established distinctions together in a transparent assessment procedure for specific episodes of change, and to test additional explanatory power against simpler alternatives.

The limiting case is deliberately admitted: perhaps the result will prove to be a carefully described internalised transformation, without a new, independent foundational theory. That would be a professionally useful clarification. An inappropriate promise of novelty would not constitute a gain in scientific knowledge.

Laloux (2016, p. 131) explicitly connects management practices with their underlying worldviews. His observation that an outward adoption of practices may come to nothing when leadership orientation remains unchanged overlaps with our question. It should therefore be classified as existing prior work, rather than retrospective confirmation of an exclusively original discovery.

The illustrated edition describes twelve pioneering organisations examined in depth, selected from a wider field of research. Selection already required recognisable Teal practices (p. 11). This permits rich case-based inspiration, but no general success rate against a representative comparison. On p. 138, Laloux himself identifies a lack of in-depth research into the actual courses of transformation. His further claims concerning stages and superiority are not adopted here.

Of particular importance for our foundation is that self-management in Laloux requires structures and coordination mechanisms (pp. 62-65). The relationship between orientation and rules is reciprocal. Trust alone does not replace competence, responsibility or feedback. The colour hierarchy in his presentation serves here neither as a diagnosis of an individual nor as a moral ranking of companies or religions.